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Kant doesn't make it any easier for his reader to understand his first 
critique when he fails to tell us bluntly that consciousness should not be 
understood as a mental or, if one prefers, a psychic reality. As long as we think 
of consciousness as somehow mental, we'll wonder how to accommodate the 
fact that mentality most often comes across as individualized, as distributed in 
finite minds, yet Kant surely means to be talking about liI.!ll:. consciousness, not 
this or that consciousness. Moreover, were consciousness not other than mental, 
neither Kant nor for that matter, Hegel, could seriously mean to seek "objective" 
knowledge instead of intersubjective knowing. For both, to conceive 
consciousness as psychic would forbid moving from consciousness as ~ to 
the kind of unique subjectivity required to make judgements Qf m:!Y. kind. If 
instead consciousness is treated as a kind of nonindividualized, high-energy 
mental stuff, no subjectivities robust enough to make judgments will ever occur. 
If the subjectivity required to make judgments which can in principle be right 
bccaUaQ they can in principle be wrong is to survive, this Glop Theory of 
Consciousness and thus of subjectivity must be rejected. Neither Kant nor 
Hegel can anow consciousness as a sameness which includes difference as 
difference of a kind and thus includes difference as the structure of sameness. 
The self-identity of individuals requires only a partly nonindividual sameness 
(or there would be no need to recognize both similarity and difference 
simultaneously); the sameness or self·identity of individuals which are also 
subjcctivities allows only a partly non-individual sameness (or there would be 
no capacity to recognize both simultaneously). 
A voiding this menlalization of consciousness does not, however, allow 
Kant to avoid accounting for the particularity which is represented in part by the 
individuality of minds. Neither will Kant be able to get away with the treatment 
he affords this variety of particularity by conf:lating some of these notions under 
the title of a "self' and then confining that structure to a mere regulative idea of 
reason. He has to get freedom and subjectivity from somewhere, presumably 
from consciousness, yet in the usual characterization, consciousness is tied too 
tightly to the phenomenal realm to allow Kant a plausible treatment of 
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particularity. Ifone focuses only upon the first critique, Kant all but identifies 
particularity with sense particulars, seeming to think that he can handle 
particularity merely by distinguishing between transcendental and empirical 
ideality. Plainly he was thinking only about objective empirical knowledge and 
thus identifying particularity with sense partiCUlars. Had he not made that 
identification, it would not be terribly difficult to eliminate particularity instead 
via the "general particulars" or instances ploy. He might wen have said, for 
example, that any phenomenon, as a determinate object x, is a particular but a 
particular in the sense of a fusion of phenomenal particulars (as universalized, 
generalized particulars corresponding to the transcendental modes of cognition) 
and sense-particulars (tantamount to alterations in the subjective constitution of 
the knower, having no objective validity). Geneml particulars would constitute 
the realm of possible experience; sense particulars would arise in actual 
experience. He could then argue that we think by rules and that as such, a priori 
truths are dependent upon beings which are themselves general particulars. 
But the problem isn't with consciousness as instances, it's with 
consciousness as subjectivities. Kant recognizes this problem himself, at least 
implicitly, in his distinction between pure and practical reason as well as in the 
paralogisms. For Kant, pmctical reason makes its objcct actual, its object being 
freedom. The making of a kingdom of ends is actually the constitution of an 
inLersubjcctive domain of freedom, a nonphenomenal domain, which yields the 
intersubjcctive ought as contrasted to lhe objective/necessary must. He thinks 
we cannot say that we are free in Ule direct way that we can say that we cognize 
that chair. In the latLer case, the we is dominant to the extent that our cognitive 
experience of the chair is shared knowledge where in the former case, only I can 
say that I am free. Any "we" resulting from this activity is intersubjective. The 
recognition by the "In of freedom requires us to infer that "we" is free. 
Intersubjectivity must, then, be the locus of both freedom and of subjectivity 
since if intersubjectivity were reached (epistemologically) prior to this 
constituting, objective knowledge could degcnemte in collective illusion. 
But how can we assign the required texLure to intersubjectivity when 
that structure must rest upon fiercely independent subjectivities? The best hope 
lies in the recognition that any analysis of reason which when made consistent 
as it was by Hegel must identify being with knowing and must treat reason's 
project of self.knowledge as bi-directional. It is in a sense easier to work from 
the "outside" in, to proceed as Kant did in the Prolegomena and in at least some 
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portions of the first critique, by examining the alleged products of reason and 
then to infer what the cognitive faculties must be like given the evident products. 
This activity, for Kant, yields objective knowledge. But what of the product of 
reason called the "phenomenal self'? How does one examine that product, a 
product SO different from the rest that Kant even says that although detennined 
in time, space has no role in its status? It would seem that reason must in this 
case be examined from the "inside". The immediate problem, however, is that 
we now have a process of a self~knowing reason and that activity, as knowledge, 
cannot be undertaken from a subjective ground but only from an intersubjective 
ground. Intersubjectivity, then, has to be the recognition of similarity through 
difference, an activity which requires giving subjectivity its due without giving 
it everything. Each locus must reach the others primarily through their 
particularity rather than through their commonalities. 
Otherness and subjectivity therefore necessarily arise in tandem, just as 
Hegel said they did. We require otherness to link the "inside" and the "outside" 
especially when we're dealing with a philosopher whose work when taken 
seriously, as seriously, say, as Hegel took Kant, links being and knowledge 
inextricably. Otherness is necessary to identify them in both epistemological 
and in ontological tenns: 
1) as a mode of being- the slatus of a thing in itself 
2) as a mode of knowledge- the consciousness of the 
objects' relation to a subject 
2) balances 1) in the subject~object relation; 1) balances 2) in the 
subject-subject relation. Together they fonn a continuum from knowledge/being 
to being/knowledge as the basis for the movement from objective to 
intersubjective knowledge. These two must balance each other to prevent 
dissolution into subjective atomicity, which would forbid any identity stronger 
than that of logical identity, the identity of consciousnesses as instances. 
Intersubjectivity turns out on this reading to be the condition of subjectivity; the 
self can never be 2nlY. self-identical. It must be denied absoluteness to preserve 
itself. 
To handle particularity in even the kind of first approximation sketched 
thus far, then, consciousness simply must be treated in both epistemological and 
ontological terms. Noumena simply cannot be left in blessed ignorance. The 
claim in the first critique that consciousness represents a veil marking the 
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interface of the phenomenal and the noumenal realms is acceptable only as long 
as the phenomenaIlnoumenal distinction is merely the epistemelogical mate of 
what should be the ultimate pairing here, the one and the many. On this dual 
account, when you know something, you are backing away from it into your 
own sUbjectivity. The intuited object becomes less fully determinate; 
correspondingly, it becomes increasingly relational/empirical. "Consciousness 
oC' itself is inherently relational above the level of the bare spatial-temporal 
localization of intuited objects. Objects of experience become increasingly less 
determinate, and correspondingly more complex. To the extent that they are 
known, being and knowing are opposites; this is expressed epistemologically in 
the phenomena/noumena dichotomy. But for Kant, being and knowing are 
identified insofar as we can know (experientially). This suggests that what 
underlies the phenomenal (knowing) self. as bound to experiential knowledge, is 
not identical with what underlies the noumenal (existent) self, which is free and 
thus ~ make judgements. 
Consciousness of itself could help to bridge the gap between the 
noumenal (subjective) self and the phenomenal self if "consciousness oC' is 
regarded as a fusion of the two, a subjective mentality. In not entirely 
metaphorical terms, consciousness itself would be regarded as a sort of wave, 
the pulsating, uniulrY interface of opposites. Its structure as we infer it is logical 
while its content, aside from this structure, is unknown, thus incorporating 
Kant's notion of the limiting factor of experience, consciousness of. Around 
this wave, imagine four interwoven threads, space-time incarnate. At certain 
points (or instants), these four threads intersect with each other and with 
consciousness. These intersections would yield nascent subjectivities. The 
unity of consciousness and the unity of space-time at these loci thereby generate 
mentality as a function of consciousness. 
Yes, we have indeed departed from the master but there's no help for it. 
What Kant says about the unity of consciousness as providing the unity ofthe 
pure intuitions, jointly and separately, is eitller flat wrong or true only 
epistemologically. Kant is right to say that space and time inhabit us as 
intuitions but he is wrong in asserting that they would not exist apart from 
consciousness. They need to be both phenomenal ancI noumenal to avoid the 
idealism/self-identity problem (identity like subjectivity needs a noumenal basis) 
and to enable beings "determined in time" to be also free. 
Put bluntly, finite minds could not exist without contributions from a 
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self-existent space-time. Finite minds cannot be merely immanent in each other 
(too similar. thus no change) nor can they be entirely discontinuous (no 
simultaneity), It is no surprise that we do not experience space-time as being as 
continuous as Kant thought each was or as discontinuous as, Whitehead thought. 
We experience space-time as a continuum in which unitary space is presented as 
simultaneous (in time) and successive times are represented only via alterations 
registered within unitary space through time. Thus space and time are what they 
are for us (as phenomenal) only in tandem. We experience space-time in this 
manner, i.e., phenomenally, as successive continuity rather than immanence 
because we're not m!.l.Y. subjectivities. We are also phenomenal beings and thus 
must always have a very tentative grasp of the noumenal, a grasp so tentative 
that if the need for a plausible account of particularity and freedom and 
subjectivity did not drive us to that account, we would follow Kant and put off 
consideration of our membership in the "intelligible" world until the second and 
third critiques. Fortunately, the epistemological status of space and time 
provides the best guide to inferences about their ontological status. For us, 
space and time are almost but not quite interchangeable, are sometimes one 
thing, sometimes two, but never anything fully reconciled. That metastable 
status is reflected in a qualitative gap between consciousness and consciousness 
of, derivatively between "outer" experience and "inner" sense. This gap must be 
present because our potential consciousness of experience arises out of a fusion 
of space-time which would make all experience (including that of space­
time)impossible in the absence of such a gap. With respect to the not quite 
metaphorical interpretation offered just a bit ago, space and time seem almost to 
be alternate, super-imposed waves which intersect only along the consciousness 
wave, a duality which underscores the difficulty consciousness always has with 
being forever out of synchronization with itself. One is strongly tempted to 
believe that in themselves, space and time are as much other than each other as 
they are other than consciousness. Yes, that does suggest that they may present 
an alternative ontological realm. No, we're not going to pursue that suggestion 
here. 
Instead, let's see to what extent these extensions deal with some of 
Kant's vices without abandoning his virtues. Given this account of space-time, 
the cognitive process of any human subject may be presented as a continuum 
consisting of the following moments: 
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1. 	 Consciousness - an inferred logical structure but 

unknown content. 

2. 	Consciousness -the spawn of space-time and 

consciousness, textured by both. 

3. Mentality - fluid structure and experiential content. 
How does the phenomenalnoumena distinction fare when looked at 
from this vantage point? 
Phenomena - empirical intuitions present to the inner sense which 
includes this entire apparatus of knowing arise on the edge of "consciousness 
of', the interface between the noumenal realm and the structures which confer 
human significance upon it (consciousness as a limiting factor). In 
consequence: 
a. We experience all phenomena including the phenomenal self as 
pinned down in space-time. 
1) The initial encounter will be the relatively static/passive isolation of 
the mere form of appearance (extension and figure) of the object. 
2) Intuition cuts the object's form out of the fabric of space-time 
producing a highly determinate intuited object. 
b. If there were no gap between consciousness and "consciousness of", 
and derivatively between "consciousness of' and its objects, this atomicity is as 
far as experience could go and we could never get from intuited objects in 
general to objects of experience. 
1) The lag between immediate (outer sense; intuited objects) and 
mediate experience (inner sense; involving objects of experience) produces an 
increasingly less immediate, and therefore determinate cognitive process. The 
intuited object is "painted in" via concepts; this determines what lies in 
experience (objects of experience) in a more "empirical", less determinate form. 
2) Concepts and intuitions acting in tandem constrain the imagination; 
in unison. these three generate experience just as Kant says they do. 
3) Knowing therefore represents a progressive modification of mind 
which heightens subjectivity which in tum allows judgments accommodating 
particularity without abandoning Kant's passion for generality. 
Perhaps it is nO,t too much to hope he might be pleased. 
